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Abstract: This paper analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel 
model and dataset.  We obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds, with 
detailed records on 238 funds raised between 1992 and 2006.  Fund managers earn 
revenue from a variety of fees and profit-sharing rules. We build a model to estimate the 
expected revenue to managers as a function of these rules, and we test how this estimated 
revenue varies across the characteristics of our sample funds. Among our sample funds, 
about 60 percent of expected revenue comes from fixed-revenue components which are 
not sensitive to performance. We find major differences between venture capital (VC) 
funds and buyout (BO) funds – the two main sectors of the private equity industry.   In 
general, BO fund managers earn lower revenue per managed dollar than do managers of 
VC funds, but nevertheless these BO managers earn substantially higher revenue per 
partner and per professional than do VC managers.  Furthermore, BO managers build on 
their prior experience by raising larger funds, which leads to significantly higher revenue 
per partner and per professional, despite the fact that these larger funds have lower 
revenue per dollar.  Conversely, while prior experience by VC managers does lead to 
higher revenue per partner in later funds, it does not lead to higher revenue per 
professional. Taken together, these results suggest that the BO business is more scalable 
than the VC business.   
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I. Introduction 
Worldwide, private equity funds manage approximately $1 trillion of capital.   
About two-thirds of this capital is managed by buyout funds, where leverage can multiply 
the investment size by three or four times base capital.  In the early 21
st century, these 
buyout funds are responsible for about one-quarter of all global M&A activity.  Venture 
capital funds – the other main type of private equity – raised nearly $160 billion of capital 
during the boom years of 1999 and 2000, and made early investments in recent successes 
like Google (in the United States), Skype (in Europe), and Baidu (in Asia).  Overall, 
private equity funds play an increasingly important role as financial intermediaries in 
addition to their significant day-to-day involvement as board members and advisors.   
Nevertheless, relatively little is known about industrial organization of the private equity 
sector, mostly due to data limitations.  This paper aims to fill that gap using a database of 
fund characteristics, past performance, and fund terms provided by one of the largest 
private-equity investors in the world.    
Virtually all private-equity funds are organized as limited partnerships, with 
private equity firms serving as the general partner (GP) of the funds, and large 
institutional investors and wealthy individuals providing the bulk of the capital as limited 
partners (LPs).  These limited partnerships typically last for 10 years, and partnership 
agreements signed at the funds’ inceptions clearly define the expected payments to GPs. 
These payments consist of both fixed and variable components.  While the fixed 
component resembles pricing terms of mutual-fund and hedge-fund services, the variable   3
component has no analogue among most mutual funds and is quite different from the 
variable incentive fees of hedge funds.
1   
Successful private equity firms stay in business by raising a new fund every 3 to 5 
years.  If the current fund performs well, and LPs interpret that performance as “skill” 
rather than “luck”, investors’ demand curve for the new fund will shift out, with the 
equilibrium conditions requiring that LPs earn their cost-of-capital after payments to the 
GP. In response to this demand shift, GPs may alter the terms of the new fund so as to 
earn higher expected revenue for each dollar under management.  Alternatively, they may 
increase the size of their next fund.  They may also do both.  Raising the size of the fund 
may entail additional costs, depending on the production function for the underlying 
private-equity activities.  Do successful private equity managers earn higher revenue by 
setting higher prices, raising larger funds, or both?  Do these strategies differ between 
venture capital (VC) and buyout (BO) funds?  What can these strategies tell us about 
organizational economics of private equity funds? In this paper, we address these 
questions using a novel model and dataset.  
We are not the first authors to investigate the revenue-based terms of private 
equity partnerships. The seminal paper on this topic is Gompers and Lerner (1999), who 
focus exclusively on venture capital funds and explore the cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the fund terms.  Litvak (2004) addresses similar issues from a legal 
perspective, and extends the Gompers and Lerner analysis to consider several additional 
terms from the partnership agreements. Neither of these papers addresses buyout funds – 
                                                 
1 See Chordia (1996), Ferris and Chance (1987), Tufano and Sevick (1997), Christoffersen (2001), and 
Christoffersen and Musto (2002) for analyses of fee structures in the mutual fund industry.  See Goetzmann, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2006) for analyses of fee structures in the hedge 
fund industry.    4
the largest part of our sample and the part with the most variation – nor do they use an 
option-pricing framework to value the variable-revenue components. As we will see, 
many of the most important conclusions are driven by variation that can only be captured 
in this framework.  On the modeling side, Conner (2005) uses simulation to estimate the 
value of various pricing terms, but he takes an ex-post perspective (which requires 
specific assumptions about fund returns), rather than the ex-ante perspective (based on 
equilibrium relations) taken in our paper.
2      
In Section II, we discuss our data sources, define the key revenue variables used 
in the paper, and summarize these variables for our sample funds.  Our main data set is 
provided by one of the largest LPs in the world, which we refer to as “the Investor”. In 
the course of making investment decisions in private equity funds, the Investor requires 
potential GPs to provide information about internal fund organization in addition to 
providing standard documentation of fund terms.  The Investor provided us access to 
these data for 238 funds raised between 1992 and 2006, of which 94 are VC funds and 
144 are BO funds.   
In Section III, we develop an expected-revenue model for private equity firms.  
Section III.A discusses the model for fixed revenue (“management fees”), Section III.B 
discusses the model for the largest component of variable revenue (“carried interest”), 
and Section III.C discusses two other components of variable revenue that are specific to 
BO funds: “transaction fees” and “monitoring fees”.  (All of these terms will be defined 
in Section II.)   As compared to previous models in the literature, our main contributions 
                                                 
2 There is also a related and growing literature that examines the performance of private equity funds.  See 
Woodward (2004), Cochrane (2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006), Groh 
and Gottschalg (2007), and Cao and Lerner (2007).  We abstract from all performance issues by positing an 
equilibrium condition where, in expectation, LPs receive exactly their cost of capital.  This equilibrium 
condition is discussed in Section III.B.1.      5
here are to adopt an option-pricing framework for the valuation of variable revenue, and 
to anchor all of our key model inputs to industry data.  Section III.D summarizes the 
outputs of the model.  This framework allows us to identify several important 
determinants of fund revenue that have not previously been measured.    
Section IV provides the main empirical results of the paper.  Using the revenue 
estimates from the models of Section III, we empirically test for the relationship of 
various revenue measures with fund characteristics and past performance. Among our 
sample funds, about 60 percent of the expected revenue comes from fixed revenue 
components. We find striking differences between VC and BO funds.  In general, BO 
funds earn lower revenue per managed dollar than do venture capital funds, but 
nevertheless these BO funds earn substantially higher revenue per partner and per 
professional than do VC funds.  Furthermore, BO funds build on past success by raising 
larger funds, which leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional, 
despite the fact that these larger funds have lower revenue per dollar.  Conversely, while 
past success by VC funds does lead to higher revenue per partner, it does not lead to 
higher revenue per professional.   Section V concludes the paper.  
 
II.  Data and Summary Statistics 
In this section, we describe the dataset and define some key terms.   
 
A.  Data sources 
We construct our dataset from several sources.  Our main data source is the 
Investor, from whom we obtained detailed information on terms and conditions for 238   6
private equity funds raised between 1992 and 2006.  In addition to terms and conditions, 
we also obtained information on the fund management firms’ past investment experience, 
returns, investment focus, and team composition.  We use this data to construct expected-
revenue measures for each fund manager.   In addition, we use several other sources to 
supplement and verify information from the Investor.  One is Galante’s Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Directory (Asset Alternatives, 2006), which provides a nearly 
comprehensive reference of publicly available information about private equity funds.  
This publication enables us to cross-check some of the information provided by the 
Investor and fill in occasional omissions, but does not provide any information about 
fund terms or past returns. In recent years, some fund-level return data has become 
publicly available.  This data is summarized in the Private Equity Performance Monitor 
2006 (Private Equity Intelligence, 2006), which we use to benchmark the performance of 
our sample funds.  This benchmarking is aided by industry-level returns data from the 
Investment Benchmarks Reports published by Venture Economics (2006a and 2006b).    
 
B.  Definitions and Summary Statistics  
Table I presents summary statistics for our sample.  The sample consists of 238 
funds, of which 94 are VC funds and 144 are BO funds.  Overall, about three-quarters of 
these funds focus on investments in the United States, and the majority of the remaining 
funds are focused on investments in Europe.  Unlike mutual funds, private equity funds 
do not have a well-defined level of assets under management.  Instead, GPs receive 
commitments from LPs to provide funds when needed for new investments.  The total 
amount of such LP commitments for any given fund is defined as the committed capital   7
of the fund. The median VC fund in our sample has $225M in committed capital, and the 
median BO fund has $600M.  Note that the interquartile range for the size of BO funds is 
from $297M to $1500M, versus a much smaller range of $100M to $394M for VC funds.   
Table I also shows that the median GP of a VC fund has raised one fund prior to 
the sample fund, has been in business for three years, and has four partners; the median 
GP of a BO fund has raised one fund prior to the sample fund, has been in business for 
six years and has five partners.  Overall, these are small organizations, with the median 
VC fund having only nine professionals (= partners + non-partners) and the median BO 
fund having 13 professionals.  The largest VC fund in our example is staffed by less than 
50 professionals; the largest buyout fund is staffed by less than 100.
3  Outside of our 
sample, Asset Alternatives (2006) reports only a few private equity organizations with 
more than 100 investment professionals.   
In materials provided to the Investor, GPs must provide information about typical 
investment size, which then implies an expected number of investments for each fund.  
We summarize this expected number in the last row of Panels A and B. The median VC 
fund expects to make 20 investments, which yields five investments per partner at that 
fund.  Since each investment typically requires significant work from a venture capitalist, 
it is difficult for this ratio to grow much higher, and few VC funds expect to make more 
than ten investments per partner.   BO funds tend to make larger investments and require 
even more intense involvement on each one, with the median fund making only 12 
investments, or 2.4 per partner. In the revenue model of Section III.B, the expected 
                                                 
3 Note that the number of professionals dedicated to a fund is not necessarily the same as the number of 
professionals employed at the GP firm.  The GP firm may engage in more than one type of private equity 
and raise different types of funds; in such cases, the number of professionals employed at the firm level 
may exceed the number of professionals dedicated to a fund.  Our data allows us to distinguish between 
these two measures.   8
number of investments plays an important role in driving the overall volatility of the fund 
portfolio, which in turn has a significant effect on the expected present value of revenue.     
GPs earn fixed revenue – which is not based on the performance of the fund – 
through management fees. To see how management fees are calculated, we need to define 
several terms. Over the lifetime of the fund, some of the committed capital is used for 
these fees, with the remainder used to make investments. We refer to these components 
of committed capital as lifetime fees and investment capital, respectively.  At any point in 
time, we define the invested capital of the fund as the portion of investment capital that 
has already been invested into portfolio companies.  Net invested capital is defined as 
invested capital, minus the cost basis of any exited investments.  Similarly, contributed 
capital is defined as invested capital plus the portion of lifetime fees that has already 
been paid to the fund, and net contributed capital is equal to contributed capital minus the 
cost basis of any exited investments.  The typical fund has a lifetime of ten years, with 
general partners allowed to make investments in new companies only during the first five 
years (the investment period), with the final five years reserved for follow-on investments 
and the exiting of existing portfolio companies. 
Most funds use one of four methods for the assessment of management fees.   
Historically, the most common method was to assess fees as a constant percentage of 
committed capital. For example, if a fund charges 2 percent annual management fees on 
committed capital for ten years, then the lifetime fees of the ten-year fund would be 20 
percent of committed capital, with investment capital comprising the other 80 percent.  In 
recent years, many funds have adopted a decreasing fee schedule, with the percentage 
falling after the investment period.  For example, a fund might have a 2 percent fee   9
during five-year investment period, with this annual fee falling by 25 basis points per 
year for the next five years.   
The third type of fee schedule uses a constant rate, but changes the basis for this 
rate from committed capital (first five years) to net invested capital (last five years).  
Finally, the fourth type of fee schedule uses both a decreasing percentage and a change 
from committed capital to net invested capital after the investment period.  For any fee 
schedule that uses net invested capital, the estimation of lifetime fees requires additional 
assumptions about the investment and exit rates.  In Section III.A, we discuss the 
assumptions used in our model, and the data behind these assumptions. 
The top half of Table II presents summary statistics on management-fee terms for 
the sample funds.  The most common initial fee level is 2 percent, though the majority of 
funds give some concessions to LPs after the investment period is over; e.g., switching to 
invested capital basis (43.0 percent of VC funds and 84.0 percent of BO funds), lowering 
the fee level (54.8 percent of VC funds and 45.1 percent of BO funds), or both (16.1 
percent of VC funds and 38.9 percent of BO funds).  Based on these facts, we should 
expect lifetime fees to be less than 20 percent of committed capital for most funds.   
Consistent with this expectation, in untabulated results we find that median level of 
lifetime fees is 12 (17.75) percent of committed capital for BO (VC) funds in our sample, 
with an interquartile range between 10 (14) and 13.5 (21.25) percent, respectively. 
While management fees are the only source of fixed revenue for a GP, variable 
(performance based) revenue can come from several sources: carried interest, 
transaction fees, and monitoring fees.  Of these three sources, carried interest tends to 
receive the most attention from all parties and provides the largest portion of expected   10
variable revenue for most funds. In our discussion of carried interest, it is helpful to 
distinguish among four different concepts: carry level, carry basis, carry hurdle, and 
carry timing.   The carry level refers to the percentage of “profits” claimed by the general 
partner. The carry basis refers to the standard by which profits are measured.  The carry 
hurdle refers to whether a GP must provide a preset return to LPs before collecting any 
carried interest and, if so, the rules about this preset return. Finally, carry timing, not 
surprisingly, refers to the set of rules that govern the timing of carried interest 
distributions. To see how these terms work in practice, consider a simple case with a 
carry level of 20 percent, a carry basis of committed capital, no hurdle rate, and carry 
timing that requires the repayment of the full basis before GPs receive any carry.  Under 
these terms, LPs would receive every dollar of exit proceeds until they had received back 
their entire committed capital, and then the GPs would receive 20 cents of every dollar 
after that.  Below, we discuss the typical types of variations in these terms, with summary 
statistics shown in the bottom half of Table II.    
The overwhelming majority of funds – including all 144 BO funds – use 20 
percent as their carry level.  Among the 94 VC funds, one fund has a carry level of 17.5 
percent, three funds have 25 percent, and one fund has a carry level of 30 percent.  The 
exact origin of the 20 percent focal point is unknown, but previous authors have pointed 
to Venetian merchants in the middle ages, speculative sea voyages in the age of 
exploration, and even the book of Genesis as the source.
4 Notwithstanding  this  tiny 
variation in the carry level, other fund terms in the model will give rise to significant 
variation in expected carried interest.   
                                                 
4 See Kaplan (1999) and Metrick (2007) for references and discussion.   11
There are two main alternatives for the carry basis.  The first alternative – carry 
basis equal to committed capital – is used by 92.1 percent of the VC funds and 83.2 
percent of the BO funds in our sample.  The second alternative – carry basis equal to 
investment capital – is used by the remaining funds in the sample.  The use of investment 
capital as the carry basis can have a large effect on the amount of carried interest earned 
by the fund.  As a first approximation, for a successful fund that earns positive profits – 
ignoring the effect of risk and discounting – a change in basis from committed capital to 
investment capital would be worth the carry level multiplied by lifetime fees.  
The effect of a hurdle return on expected revenue is greatly affected by the 
existence of a catch-up return for the GP. As an illustration of hurdle returns with a 
catch-up, consider a $100M fund with a carry percentage of 20 percent, a carry basis of 
all committed capital, a hurdle return of 8 percent, and a 100 percent catch-up. We keep 
things simple and imagine that all committed capital is drawn down on the first day of the 
fund, and that there are total exit proceeds of $120M, with $108M of these proceeds 
coming exactly one year after the first investment, $2M coming one year later, and $10M 
coming the year after that. Under these rules, all $108M of the original proceeds would 
go to the LPs. This distribution satisfies the 8 percent hurdle rate requirement for the 
$100M in committed capital. One year later, the catch-up provision implies that the 
whole $2M would go to the GPs; after that distribution they would have received 20 
percent ($2M) out of the total $10M in profits. For the final distribution, the $10M would 
be split $8M for the LPs and $2M for the GPs.   
Beyond this simple example, the calculations quickly become unwieldy to handle 
without a spreadsheet. The key idea is that, even with a hurdle return, the GPs with a   12
catch-up still receive the same fraction of the profits as long as the fund is sufficiently 
profitable. In this example, the fund made $20M of profits ($120M of proceeds on 
$100M of committed capital), and the GPs received 20 percent ($4M) of these profits. A 
fund with a catch-up percentage below 100 percent would still (eventually) receive 20 
percent of the profits, albeit at a slower pace than the fund in the above example. If, 
however, the fund had only earned $8M or less of profits over this time period, then all 
these profits would have gone to the LPs.    
   Table II shows that hurdle returns are much more prevalent among buyout funds 
than among VC funds (93.1% versus 47.6%).  Among funds with a hurdle rate, the modal 
rate of 8 percent is used by about two-thirds of the VC funds and three-quarters of the BO 
funds.  Virtually all funds with a hurdle use a rate between six and ten percent.  The 
majority of funds with a hurdle have a catch-up rate of 100 percent (not shown in the 
table), and most of the remaining funds have a catch-up rate of 80 percent.  Only two 
funds have a hurdle return without having any catch-up provision. 
  The final element of carried interest to be discussed is carry timing.  In the 
discussion so far, we have proceeded under the assumption that GPs must return the 
entire carry basis to LPs before collecting any carried interest.  The reality can be quite 
different, with funds using a variety of rules to allow for an early collection of carried 
interest upon a profitable exit.  When such early carry is taken, the LPs typically have the 
ability to “clawback” these distributions if later performance is insufficient to return the 
full carry basis. In the present version of the model, we have not incorporated any of 
these variations – we assume that all funds are using the base-case terms with a return of 
the full basis before any carry is collected.   13
  Aside from carried interest, the other two components of variable revenue are 
transaction fees and monitoring fees.  Both of these fees are common features for BO 
funds, and are rare for VC funds.  When a BO fund buys or sells a company, they 
effectively charge a transaction fee, similar to the M&A advisory fees charged by 
investment banks.  While this fee is rolled into the purchase price, the GP can still benefit 
if they own less than 100 percent of the company and if they share less than 100 percent 
of these transaction fees with their LPs.  About 80 percent of BO fund agreements require 
that GPs share at least some portion of these transactions fees with their LPs, with one-
third of all funds required to return all transaction fees to LPs.  Another third of funds use 
a 50/50 sharing rule between GPs and LPs, with most of the remaining funds allocating 
between 50 and 100 percent for the LPs.  While VC funds often have these sharing rules 
written into their partnership agreements, transaction fees are nevertheless rare in VC 
transactions and thus are not covered in our analysis. In terms of performance sensitivity, 
entry transaction fees (assessed at the time of asset purchase) are largely determined as a 
fixed % of investment capital
5, whereas exit transaction fees (assessed at the time of asset 
sale) are realized only at exits and are based on realization values.   Thus we treat entry 
transaction fees as a fixed revenue component and exit transaction fees as a variable 
revenue component.  
  In addition to transaction fees, BO funds often charge a monitoring fee to their 
portfolio companies.  In most cases, these fees are shared with LPs receiving 80 percent 
and GPs receiving 20 percent.  We did not consistently code for the differences in the 
sharing rule for monitoring fees, so in our model we assume all BO funds use the same 
                                                 
5 Leverage is another important determinant of entry transaction fees.  In the present version of the model 
we assume a fixed leverage ratio of 2:1.     14
80/20 rule. While there is no set schedule for these fees, industry practitioners have told 
us that these fees range between one and five percent of EBITDA each year, with smaller 
companies falling on the higher side of that range.  In Section III.C, we discuss our 
method for modeling these fees.  As with transaction fees, monitoring fees are rare for 
VC funds, so we do not include them in our estimates of VC fund revenue. Since 
monitoring fees are based on operating performance of portfolio companies under BO 
fund ownership, we treat monitoring fees as a variable revenue component.   
 
III.  A Model of Expected Revenue for Private Equity Funds  
In this section, we discuss our models for the present value of GP revenue.   
Section III.A presents a model of management fees that takes account of differences 
observed in our sample. Section III.B presents a model for carry revenue, based on a risk-
neutral option-pricing approach.  Section III.C appends a model for transaction fees and 
monitoring fees onto the model of Section III.B. Section III.D summarizes the model 
outputs for some benchmark cases.  
Why is it necessary to build these models at all? Instead, why not just use the data 
to estimate the actual revenue earned by the funds?  We use the models because we want 
to measure the ex ante revenue as a function of fund terms.  We are attempting to 
measure whether fund terms vary with fund characteristics, not whether fund terms 
predict performance.  In a very large sample, one would expect these two approaches to 
be the same, but in our small sample they could be quite different.  Furthermore, the 
cash-flow data available for our sample funds is limited, and does not separate LP   15
payments into the necessary components.  Overall, the ex post analysis would not be 
feasible with our data. 
 
A.  Management Fees 
In our model, we assume that funds are fully invested at the end of investment 
period.   Using quarterly cash-flow data drawn from over 500 completed funds
6, we 
construct size-weighted average investment pace of VC and BO funds, respectively, and 
use annualized versions of the empirically-derived investment pace as inputs in our 
model.  For example, a 10-year VC fund that has a 5-year investment period invests 30%, 
24%, 31%, 12%, and 3% of its investment capital in years one through five, respectively.  
For BO funds, the pace is 26%, 23%, 25%, 18%, and 8%.    
For exits, we take the investment pace above as given, and use simulations to 
draw random time to exit according to the same exponential distribution as used in the 
carry model of Section III.B.   For the benchmark case, we assume that VC funds make 
25 investments per fund and that each investment is equal in size.  For buyout funds, the 
benchmark case uses 11 investments.  Panel A of Table III reports an example calculation 
for a BO fund with a five-year investment period. In this example, the net invested capital 
grows for the first 3 years as the bulk of new investments are made and relatively few 
exits occur, but starts declining before the end of investment period as the investment 
pace slows down and the exit pace increases.   
                                                 
6 We thank Private Equity Intelligence for providing us with this data.     16
The amount of management fees is a function of fee level, fee basis, committed 
capital, net invested capital, and the establishment cost of the fund.
7  For each fund in our 
sample, we solve for the exact investment capital and lifetime fees such that  
 
Committed capital = investment capital + lifetime fees + establishment cost    (1)   
 
Since fees are a contractual obligation of the limited partners, we treat these fees 
as a riskfree revenue stream to the GP with a five percent discount rate.
8   Using this 
discount rate, we obtain the PV of management fees for each fund.  Panel B of Table III 
shows an example for a $100M BO fund that charges 2 percent fees on committed capital 
for the first 5 years, 2 percent fees on net invested capital for the next 5 years, and has 1 
percent establishment cost; the lifetime fees and PV of management fees are $12.77M 
and $11.07M, respectively.   
 
B.  Carried Interest  
For GPs, carried interest is like a fractional call option on the total proceeds of all 
investments, with this fraction equal to the carry level and the strike price of the call 
equal to the carry basis. In our model, we use simulation to obtain the exit dates and 
returns for each of the underlying investments, and then we use risk-neutral valuation to 
estimate the carried-interest option on these investments.  For a portfolio of publicly 
                                                 
7 General establishment cost for the fund is charged to the fund.  Funds set a maximum amount that GPs are 
allowed to charge either as dollar amounts or % of fund size.  We assume that the GPs charge the maximum 
amount allowed in the partnership agreement.  A common maximum is $1 million.  
8 If LPs default on their fee obligations, then they forfeit all current fund holdings to the partnership.  Since 
these holdings typically exceed the future fee obligations, the fee stream is effectively collateralized and 
can be treated as being close to riskfree for the GPs.     17
traded assets with known volatilities and expiration dates, this process would be 
conceptually straightforward. In the private-equity environment, however, we have to 
deal with several complications. 
 
1)  Private equity investors provide valuable services (time, contacts, reputation) 
in addition to their cash investments. How do these services get incorporated 
into the option-pricing problem?  
2)  How can we estimate the volatility and correlation of the underlying 
(untraded) investments? 
3)  Each investment in a private-equity portfolio has an unknown exit date.  How 
can this be incorporated into an option-pricing framework? 
4)  Standard option-pricing methods require strong no-arbitrage assumptions.   
How can we reconcile these assumptions with the reality of illiquid private 
markets? 
 
We discuss our approach for handling each of these complications in Sections B.1, 
B.2, B.3, and B.4, respectively.  In Section B.5, we present our model of carried interest 
and discuss the outputs of this model for several typical structures. 
 
B.1 – The Value of Private–Equity Services 
In every transaction, a GP invests dollars, but also invests time, energy, and a 
share of their reputation.  Thus, following a transaction, the “market valuation” of the 
fund’s stake should include not only the dollars invested, but also some expected value of   18
these non-pecuniary components.  To capture these components, we posit a partial-
equilibrium framework where GPs invest if and only if the value of their investment is 
equal to the cost of the investment, where this equality is net of any revenue paid to GPs.   
To model this decision, we start with the cost side.  Consider first a simple case 
where all investments and fee payments are made on the same day. Then, suppose that a 
fund invests $Ii in company i, with this $Ii investment comprising some fraction f of the 
investment capital of the fund.  From the perspective of a limited partner, if we assign a 
pro rata share of the lifetime fees to this investment, the full cost (= LP cost) of the 
investment could be written as 
 
LP costi =  f *  committed capital = Ii * (committed capital / investment capital)   (2) 
   
In a more realistic scenario, investments are spread out over the investment period 
of the fund, and fees are spread over the full lifetime. To handle this case, we express all 
outlays in present value terms, as of the inception date of the fund.  Equation (3) gives the 
present value analogue for Equation (2): 
 
PV(LP costi) = PV(Ii) +  f *  PV(lifetime  fees).     (3) 
 
In the remainder of this discussion, we suppress the present value notation and 
simply use “LP Cost” to refer to both sides of Equation (3). Now, on the benefit side, the 
present value of the investment, Vi, that belongs to the fund can be divided into two 
components.  The GP valuei represents the present value of all variable revenue from this   19
investment: carried interest plus transactions fees plus monitoring fees. The LP valuei 
represents the present value of everything else: LP valuei = Vi – GP valuei.  In the absence 
of principal-agent conflicts, a GP would invest if and only if LP valuei ≥ LP costi.  To pin 
down the LP value, we assume a competitive market for private equity investment, where 
fund managers capture all the rents for the scarce skills, so that LP valuei = LP costi.  
Thus, the value of the underlying asset is  
 
 Vi = LP valuei + GP valuei = LP costi + GP valuei.         (4) 
 
   Let GP value be the sum of the GP valuei, i = 1, …, N, where N is the number of 
investments in a fund.  Similarly, let V be the sum of Vi.  Let GP% represent the 
expected percentage of each investment that belongs to the GP: GP% = GP value / V.  
Then, summing over i = 1, …, N, dividing both sides of (4) by V, and rearranging terms 
we have 
 
  1 = LP Cost / V + GP Value / V  = LP cost / V  + GP%   
  →  V = LP Cost / (1 – GP%)            (5) 
 
Equation (5) is our key equilibrium condition. The logic here is similar to Berk 
and Green (2004): the managers are in possession of scarce skills, and they adjust prices 
and quantities to capture all of the rents from these skills. A graphical illustration of this 
condition is given in Figure 1.  Consider an investment that would be worth $1 to a 
passive investor.  In equilibrium, the price of this asset to passive investors would also be   20
$1.  For an active investor, however, the value of the asset may be greater than $1.  Let 
$b represent the increased value over some unknown holding period, as shown on the 
left-axis of Figure 1.  Such increased value could come from many sources: one simple 
case would be that the investor provides below-cost management services to the 
company.
9  (If $b is zero or negative, then presumably the active investor would need to 
find another line of work.) If these value-added services are bundled with an ownership 
stake, then the investor should be able to demand a discount from the $1 price, since the 
present owners will see the value of their remaining stake increase with the value add.  In 
Figure 1, this discount is shown on the left-axis as $a.  After his discount, the fund pays 
$Ii = $(1-a) for each $(1+b) value of the asset, so that $(a + b) represents the excess value 
to the fund.
10   
On the right-hand axis, we show one example of how this value is allocated.  In 
expectation, the GP value is equal to GP% * (1+b), where GP% is a function of the 
variable revenue terms in the partnership agreement. Furthermore, if the fund pays $1-a 
for an investment, then the LP cost can be represented as $(1-a) plus the (present value 
of) the pro-rata share of management fees. (In the figure, the management fees are shown 
as larger than $a, but this does not have to be true.)  Our equilibrium condition of 
Equation (4) requires that this LP cost be exactly equal to the LP value: to achieve this 
equilibrium, the fund adjusts the terms of its partnership agreement so that GP% and 
                                                 
9 Hellmann and Puri (2002) find that VC-backing is related to a variety of professionalization measures, 
such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans and the hiring of a marketing VP.  
Hellmann and Puri (2000) also report that VC-backing is associated with a significant reduction in the time 
to bring a product to market, especially for innovation firms.  Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) find 
that portfolio companies of better-networked VC firms are significantly more likely to survive to 
subsequent financing and eventual exit.    
10 Hsu (2004) finds that experienced VCs actually do receive price breaks as compared to less-experienced 
VCs. One could also interpret $a as representing selection skill of the manager, who may be able to find 
investments at “below-market” prices. Sorensen (2007) builds a model of venture capital to disentangle 
such selection ability (= $a in our framework) from value-adding activities (= $b in our framework).   21
management fees completely consume any surplus.  In this equilibrium, LPs receive 
exactly their cost of capital.  
 
B.2 – Volatility and Correlation 
To estimate volatility for investments by VC funds, we rely on Cochrane (2005). 
In this paper, Cochrane begins with a CAPM model of expected (log) returns for venture 
capital investments. He then uses a relatively comprehensive database of venture capital 
investments to estimate the parameters of the model.   In general, this data suffers from 
sample-selection problems: we only observe returns for a company upon some financing 
or liquidation event. To solve this problem, Cochrane simultaneously estimates 
thresholds for IPOs and bankruptcy liquidations. With these thresholds in place, the 
parameters of the CAPM equation can be estimated, and these parameters then imply 
means and standard deviations for returns.  For the whole sample, Cochrane estimated a 
volatility of 89 percent.  We round this estimate up to 90 percent in our simulations. 
For BO funds, we do not have access to a database of investments that would 
allow a replication of the Cochrane analysis.  Instead, we rely on the fact that BO funds 
sometimes invest in public companies (and take them private) or in private companies 
that are comparable in size to small public companies.  Woodward (2004) finds that the 
average beta of all buyout funds is approximately equal to one.   In general, funds achieve 
this beta by purchasing low-beta companies and levering them up.  Since this levering 
would also affect the idiosyncratic risk of these companies, we will estimate the volatility 
of BO investments as being the same as a unit beta public stock of similar size.  For a 
median BO fund of $600M making 12 investments, the average equity investment would   22
be $50M and typical leverage of 2:1 would imply a $150M company.
11  For a company 
of this size we use a small-stock volatility estimate of 60 percent from Campbell et al. 
(2001).  
Our simulation model will also require an assumption about the correlation of any 
pair of investments.  For BO funds, this pairwise correlation is chosen to match the high 
end of the correlation between small-company investments in the same industry as 
reported in Campbell et al. (2001), which is 20 percent.  For VC funds, there is no 
analogous empirical evidence.  In the absence of such evidence, we adopt an estimate of 
50 percent.  As compared to the BO correlation of 20 percent, the VC correlation will 
tend to increase the variance of VC portfolios and, thus, increase the estimate for the 
“option-like” carried interest. In Section IV, we discuss the implications of using 
different estimates for this pairwise correlation. 
 
B.3 – Unknown Exit Dates 
Carried interest is an option on a private equity portfolio, but the underlying 
investments in this portfolio have unknown exit dates. Metrick (2007) shows that the 
median first-round VC investment has an expected holding period of five years, with 
annual probability of exit close to 20 percent. We use this estimate for all VC and BO 
investments, and assume that exits follow an exponential distribution, with an exit rate of 
q = 0.20 per year.  We also assume that exits are uncorrelated with underlying returns.  
While this assumption is certainly false, it is computationally expensive to handle these 
                                                 
11 See Kaplan and Stein (1993), among others, for discussions of the financial structure of leveraged 
buyouts.  See Axelson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2007) for a theoretical analysis of the relation between 
the financial structure of buyout transactions and that of private equity partnerships as equilibrium 
outcomes.     23
correlations on large portfolios, and in robustness checks using small portfolios we have 
not found any clear pattern between correlation structure and expected carried interest. 
 
B.4 – No-Arbitrage Assumptions 
Our model uses a risk-neutral approach, which is based on strong no-arbitrage 
conditions. Since private securities are illiquid, the reality is far from this perfect-markets 
ideal. Nevertheless, this is the same assumption used in all real-option models on 
untraded assets, and conceptually does not require any more of a leap than does any other 
discounted-cash-flow analysis on such assets. It is important to note, however, that the 
valuation is only applicable for an investor that can diversify the non-systematic risks.  
The GPs cannot do this, as in general they will be unable to diversify the risk in their 
portfolio companies.  Hence, the option-based valuation of carried interest should be 
interpreted as proportional to the expected value to an outside “large” investor that holds 
some small claim on GP revenue. It should not be interpreted as expected compensation 
to the GPs.    
 
B.5 – A Model for Carried Interest 
Figure 2 gives a flowchart for the simulation model.  In STEP 1, we set the fund 
terms for each set of trials.  These terms then determine the lifetime fees and LP cost for 
the fund (as in Section III.A and Figure 1). Consider first the benchmark VC case, with a 
20 percent carry on committed capital basis with no hurdle rate.  In this benchmark case, 
the fund makes 25 investments, distributed temporally as discussed in Section III.A.  The 
goal of the simulation is to solve for expected value of carried interest at the “equilibrium   24
condition” of LP value equal to LP cost.  To find this equilibrium condition, we adjust the 
starting value for the fund.  Recall from Figure 1 that the starting value for each 
investment is a function of the (present value of) dollars invested, value added, selection 
ability, and price discounts for the fund.  In STEP 2, we set this starting value to be V0.  
STEP 3 contains the main work of the simulation: 100,000 trials for all 
investments.  Figure 3 gives a more detailed flowchart for a single trial.  In STEP 3A, we 
draw an exit time for each investment.  As in the management-fee model, we draw these 
exit times from an exponential distribution with a constant 20 percent annual rate.  Exits 
are independent across investments and are uncorrelated with investment value. Since 
funds typically last for 10 years, with up to 2 years of extension subject to LPs’ approval, 
we truncate the maximum exit time at 12 years from the fund inception date. In STEP 3B, 
we simulate a valuation path for each investment.  Each firm follows a geometric 
Brownian motion with a volatility of 90 percent.  As discussed in Section III.B.2, this 
volatility is divided into common and idiosyncratic components to imply a 50 percent 
cross-correlation between any pair of existing investments.  In STEP 3C, we use the 
carried-interest rules for the fund (as defined in STEP 1) to divide the value at each exit 
into components for the GP (carried interest) and the LP.  In STEP 3D, we use the 
riskfree discount rate to take the present value of these components as of day 0.  These 
present values are the GP value (=present value of carried interest) and the LP value. 
Returning now to Figure 2, we move to STEP 4, where we compute the average 
LP value across all 100,000 trials.  In STEP 5, we compare this estimated LP value with 
the LP cost computed in STEP 1. If this LP value is greater than the LP cost for the fund, 
then we return to STEP 2 and choose a lower value for V0, and if LP value is less than LP   25
cost, then we return to STEP 2 and choose a higher value for V0. In either case, we then 
repeat the calculations of STEP 3 using the same random draws. We continue to iterate 
this process until the LP value converges to the LP cost.  When this has been achieved, 
we label the average carried interest for those trials as the expected carried interest for 
that set of fund terms.   In the language of Figure 1, this whole procedure is trying to find 
the level of “a + b” such that LP value is equated to LP cost.  Once that value is found, 
then carried interest (=GP value) can be observed from the simulation results.  
Once the benchmark case has been solved, we change each of these assumptions: 
carry level (20, 25, or 30), basis (committed capital, 90% of committed capital, 85% of 
committed capital, and 80% of committed capital), hurdle (none, 8% with catchup, 8% 
without catchup), and number of investments (5, 15, 25, and 35).  Overall, we solve for 
144 sets (3 x 4 x 3 x 4) of VC fund terms and 108 sets (3 x 4 x 3 x 3) of BO fund terms.  
For funds with terms that are not directly covered by these combinations, we interpolate 
or extrapolate from these results.  
For BO funds the volatility and cross-correlation of BO investments is 60% and 
20%, respectively.  (The reasons for these assumptions are discussed in Section III.B.2). 
The only other difference for BO funds is that it becomes necessary to keep track of 
transactions fees and monitoring fees.  These issues are discussed in the next section. 
 
C.  Transaction Fees and Monitoring Fees 
For BO funds, we append transaction and monitoring fees to the carry model of 
Section III.B.
12  For a transaction fee schedule, we consulted with industry practitioners 
and adopted a simplified schedule of two percent on the first $100 million, one percent on 
                                                 
12 We thank Josh Lerner for suggesting this part of our analysis.    26
the next $900 million, and 50 basis points on any amount over $1 billion.  In practice, fee 
schedules are more nuanced and also drop off further at high levels.  Since these high 
levels are rarely reached in our simulations, we keep this simplified schedule.  Fees are 
assessed both for the initial investment time (asset purchase) and at the random exit time 
(asset sale).  We assume 2:1 leverage at the time of entry, with total debt (but not the 
leverage ratio) remaining constant until exit. The LP share of these fees is treated the 
same as any other distribution.  The present value of transaction fees to the GPs is 
calculated along with carried interest in STEP 5 of Figure 2.
13 
While transaction fees have an analogue in M&A advisory fees, the monitoring 
fees are more difficult to benchmark.  In informal discussions with practitioners, we were 
told that these annual fees can vary between one and five percent of EBITDA, with 
smaller companies at the high end of this scale and larger companies at the low end.  
Typically, a BO fund signs a contract with its portfolio company to provide monitoring 
services over a fixed time period.  If the company has an exit before this period expires, 
then the fund usually receives a lump sum payment at exit for the remaining present 
value of the contract.  For computational convenience, we assess all monitoring fees at 
exit, assuming a five-year contract with annual fees at two percent of EBITDA.   
Assuming a constant valuation multiple to EBITDA, the value of the monitoring contract 
would be proportional to firm value.  Using an EBITDA multiple of five, this proportion 
would be 40 basis points of firm value per year, which we assess all at once as 0.40 * 5 
years = 2 percent of firm value at exit. In all versions of the model, we use the typical 
sharing rule and allocate 80 percent of this value to the LPs and 20 percent to the GPs.  
                                                 
13 For computational ease we assume that GPs share 50% of transaction fees with LPs for all BO funds, 
reflecting the median fund characteristics.     27
As with transaction fees, the expected value of monitoring fees can be computed in STEP 
5 of Figure 2. 
 
D.  Model Outputs 
  Table IV summarizes outputs for the fee model of Section III.A.  Panel A gives 
the results for lifetime fees; Panel B presents the results for the PV of fees.  In the 
following discussion, we will focus on the lifetime fee results reported in Panel A, as the 
PV fee results are qualitatively similar.  The middle cell of Panel A.1 shows the results of 
the base case fund: 2 percent initial fee level, no fee level change, no fee basis change, 
and 10-year fund.  This means that a constant management fee of 2 percent was charged 
on $100 of committed capital every year for 10 years.  The lifetime fees are $20. (These 
values are expressed in dollars per $100 of committed capital.)  A shift to a constant fee 
level of 1.5 percent per year decreases the lifetime fees to $15.  Panel A.2 shows the 
results for a 10-year fund with investment period of 5 years that changes its fee basis to 
net invested capital after the investment period.  Continuing to focus on the base case 
fund that charges a constant fee level of 2 percent, this basis change reduces the lifetime 
fees to $12.80, a reduction of $7.20.  Thus, a shift in the fee basis from committed capital 
to net invested capital (in the post-investment period) has a greater effect on the lifetime 
fees than a 50 basis point shift in the fee level.      
  Panel A.3 presents the results for a 10-year fund that changes its fee level after the 
5-year investment period.  The middle cell in the panel shows the results of a fund that 
charges an initial fee level of 2 percent, which goes down to 1.5 percent after the 
investment period.  The fee basis is committed capital throughout the lifetime of the fund.    28
For this fund, the lifetime fees are $17.50, a reduction of $2.50 from the base case fund 
(the middle cell in Panel A.1).   
  Finally, Panel A.4 shows the results of changing both the fee basis and fee level 
after the investment period.  The middle cell shows the results of a fund that changes the 
fee basis to net invested capital and reducing the fee level to 1.5 percent (from the initial 
level of 2 percent) after the investment period.  For this fund, the lifetime fees are $12.12, 
a reduction of $7.88 from the base case fund.  Obviously, changing both fee basis and fee 
level results in the greatest concessions for GPs.    
  Table V summarizes the results of simulating present values of the carry model.  
The top left cell of Panel A.1 shows the results for the base case VC fund: 20 percent 
carry level, carry basis = committed capital, no hurdle return, and 25 investments in the 
fund.  The PV of carried interest for this base case is $8.63.  (As with all numbers in 
Table V, these values are expressed in dollars per $100 of committed capital.)  A shift to 
a hurdle rate of 8 percent (with 100 percent catch-up rate) leads to a reduction of $0.34 in 
the PV of carry, while a shift to a carry level of 25 percent would increase the PV of carry 
by $2.63. Panel A.2 shows the results for a VC fund that makes only 15 investments. 
With this smaller number of investments, the overall fund portfolio is less well-
diversified, so the volatility of the portfolio is higher and the option value (carried 
interest) is higher.  As compared to the results in Panel A.1, the PV of carried interest 
increases by between $0.39 and $0.57.   
   Panels A.3 and A.4 show the results using an investment-capital basis, where 
invested capital is set to 85 percent of committed capital.  In comparing the cells in these 
panels to their analogues in Panels A.1 and A.2, we can see that the decrease in carry   29
basis leads to increases in the PV of carry that are typically around $1.00 for a 20 percent 
carry and $1.40 for a 25 percent carry.  Thus, a shift in the carry basis from committed 
capital to investment capital has approximately half the impact as a 5 percent shift in the 
carry level.  
  Panel B of Table V summarizes the results for BO funds.  The base case, in the 
top-left cell of in Panel B-1, has 11 investments, 20 percent carry level, no hurdle, and a 
carry basis of committed capital.  The PV of carried interest in this base case is $5.88 per 
$100 of committed capital.  This is $2.75 lower than the base case for VC funds (top-left 
cell of Panel A-1).  The drivers of this difference are the higher volatility for VC 
investments (90 percent vs. 60 percent for BO investments) and the higher pairwise 
correlation between VC investments (50 percent vs. 20 percent for BO investments).  
Even though there are fewer BO investments – which tends to increase option value on 
the portfolio of such investments – the volatility and correlation effects dominate and VC 
earns a higher PV of carried interest.  The remaining cells of Panel B-1 show how the PV 
of carry is affected by changing one input at a time.  A move to an 8 percent hurdle – the 
most common case – results in a loss of $0.71 in PV of carry.  Conversely, an increase of 
the carry level to 25 percent -- a level not used by any of the BO funds in our sample – 
would increase PV of carry by $1.79.   
  Panel B-2 shows how the PV of carry is affected by a switch to 5 investments per 
fund from the base case of 11.  This change is worth between $1.32 and $1.88 per $100 
of committed capital.  Panels B-3 and B-4 provide analogues to Panels B-1 and B-2 using 
an investment-capital basis, with investment capital set to 85 percent of committed 
capital.  This change is even more important for BO funds than it is for VC funds, with   30
increases in PV of carried interest ranging from $1.49 in the base case (11 investments, 
no hurdle, and 20 percent carry) to $2.12 for a carry level of 25 percent, 5 investments, 
and an 8 percent hurdle.   
   
IV.  Empirical Results 
Using the models from Section III, we estimate the present values of all revenue 
components for all sample firms.  Table VI presents the summary statistics of these 
components.  Panel A presents the results for the VC fund sample; Panel B presents the 
results for the buyout fund sample.  The first few rows of both panels summarize the 
distributions of revenue per $100 of committed capital.  The largest two components of 
total revenue are management fees and carried interest.  For both of these components, 
VC funds have higher PV per $100 of committed capital.  Overall, the PV of total 
revenue has a median (mean) of $23.50 ($23.78) per $100 among VC funds and $19.36 
($19.76) per $100 for BO funds. 
Although the median PV of carried interest is much lower for BO funds ($5.35) 
than for VC funds ($8.86), BO funds can make up much of this difference in other 
variable revenue sources, namely monitoring fees and exit transaction fees.  In total, the 
median BO fund receives $2.11 per $100 of committed capital in PV of monitoring fees 
and exit transaction fees, thus raising the total variable revenue per $100 to $7.46.   
Similarly, the median BO fund receives $1.44 per $100 in entry transaction fees, thus 
raising the total fixed revenue per $100 to $11.78. Since we did not code any variation in 
the sharing of monitoring fees across our sample firms – restricting all firms to return 80 
percent of these fees to LPs – the only variation in expected monitoring fees comes from   31
second-order adjustments induced by other terms.  For example, as compared to the 
benchmark case, a fund with a carry level of 25 percent will require higher V in order to 
return the full LP cost to their investors.  This higher V then implies higher exit values 
and higher monitoring fees than in the benchmark case. Overall, this induced variation is 
relatively small, and most funds have expected monitoring costs that are very close to the 
sample mean of $0.82 per $100 of committed capital. 
  Although VC funds have a higher unit PV of revenue, BO managers make up for 
this by raising larger funds than VC managers.   As seen in Section II, the median BO 
fund has $600M in committed capital versus $225M for VC funds.  BO managers 
achieve this larger size without a significant increase in the number of partners and other 
professionals, so that the measures of revenue per partner and revenue per professional 
are much higher for BO funds than for VC funds.  The bottom rows in Panels A and B 
demonstrate these differences.  The median (mean) level of total revenue per partner is 
$24.07M ($35.93M) for BO funds versus $11.21M ($17.61M) for VC funds.  The 
analogous figures for total revenue per professional are $8.56M ($12.58M) for BO funds 
versus $5.68M ($6.87M) for VC funds.  At the top of the scale, BO funds enjoy an even 
greater advantage over VC funds. 
To further explore these differences we estimate a series of regressions of the 
form   
 
Revenue_Measurei = α + β1 sequence i + β2 TopQ i + year dummies + e i (6) 
        32
The dependent variable, Revenue_Measure, refers to any of the measures in Table 
VI, with each of these measures normalized in turn by the number of partners, number of 
professionals, and committed capital. Sequence is the natural logarithm of the number or 
previous funds (plus one) by the same firm.  TopQ is the number of “top quartile” funds 
in the most recent four funds raised by the same firm.  To benchmark these funds, we 
combine data from the Investor with industry benchmarks drawn from Private Equity 
Intelligence (2006) and Venture Economics (2006a and 2006b).   We also include year 
fixed effects to control for any unobserved year-specific factors.  
Table VII summarizes the results of these regressions. In each case, we estimate the 
regressions for the full sample, with separate coefficients on each variable for VC and 
BO funds.   Panel A gives results for revenue measures normalized by the number of 
partners, Panel B gives results for measures normalized by the number of professionals, 
and Panel C gives results for measures normalized by committed capital.  The coefficient 
on TopQ is not significant in any of the specifications.  The coefficient on sequence – a 
measure of firm experience – is significant in many of the specifications.  In Panel A, the 
sequence coefficient is positive and significant for both VC and BO funds in all 
specifications.  In none of the regressions in Panel A are the sequence coefficients 
significantly different between VC and BO funds.   
Panel B summarizes results for revenue measures normalized by the number of 
professionals.  In these regressions, there are many significant differences between BO 
and VC funds. In all five specifications, the sequence coefficient is positive and 
significant for BO funds but not for VC funds, and the difference between the BO and 
VC coefficients is significant at the five percent level.  Given these results, it is not   33
surprising that we also find the same pattern in the regression for total revenue per 
professional.  Taken together with the results in Panel A, it appears that BO firms are able 
to increase their revenue per partner without significantly increasing their non-partner 
staff, whereas VC firms cannot. 
The results of Panel C allow us to gain further insight into these relationships.  Here, 
the revenue measures are normalized by committed capital.  While the sequence 
coefficients are never significant for VC funds, these coefficients are negative and 
significant for BO funds in all specifications.  Also, in all cases, the BO sequence 
coefficient is significantly lower than the VC sequence coefficient.  Thus, this cross-
sectional evidence suggests that BO funds actually decrease their revenue per unit of 
committed capital as they grow more experienced.   
BO funds make up for this lower unit revenue by raising ever larger funds, as 
demonstrated in Panel D.  In this panel, we use measures of size (rather than revenue) as 
the dependent variable, with the same regressors as in the previous panels.  The first 
column shows results using the log of committed capital as the dependent variable.   
While the sequence coefficients are positive and significant for both BO and VC funds, 
the BO coefficients are more than twice as large as the VC coefficients, a difference that 
is significant at the one percent level.  As might be expected from the previous results, 
the ratio of these key coefficients is even larger when we use the log of committed capital 
per professional as the dependent variable, with the sequence coefficient for BO funds 
more than four times the size of its VC counterpart.   
Our simulation model required many assumptions, but only one of these assumptions 
– the pairwise correlation of 50 percent for VC investments, as discussed in Section   34
III.B.2 – did not have any supporting empirical evidence.  This assumption may seem to 
be high, especially in comparison to the 20 percent correlation used for BO funds.   
Nevertheless, a lower assumption for this correlation would only make our main results 
stronger: with a lower pairwise correlation, the overall volatility of the VC funds would 
be lower.  Thus, the carried interest – which is like a call option on the VC portfolio – 
would also be lower.  This change would effectively reduce the coefficients on the 
log(sequence) variables for VC funds in Table VII, as the overall dispersion in carried 
interest would be smaller. 
Overall, these results suggest that the BO and VC businesses are quite different.  The 
LP community is apparently willing to let BO funds grow significantly larger with 
experience.  While this increased size leads to downward pressure on expected revenue 
per unit of committed capital, the BO managers can more than make up for this loss by 
increasing fund size without requiring much additional staff.  In contrast, VC managers, 
while able to increase their fund size somewhat, also need to add staff at nearly the same 
rate.   In untabulated tests, we find that VC firms add an additional professional for each 
additional $100M under management; BO funds add an additional professional for each 
additional $200M under management.   
Our results support the view that BO managers with managerial ability increase fund 
size to maximize their revenue as in Berk and Green (2004), subject to (1) diminishing 
expected returns to scale, (2) investors earn zero expected excess returns, and (3) 
investors update their assessment of managerial ability from past performance.  Thus, 
performance persistence may not be observed in equilibrium in the BO industry.     35
Consistent with this interpretation, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) report that BO fund 
performance is less persistent than VC fund performance.   
 
V.  Conclusions  
This paper analyzes the economics of the private equity industry using a novel model 
and dataset.  We obtain data from a large investor in private equity funds, with detailed 
records on 238 funds raised between 1992 and 2006.  Fund managers earn revenue from a 
variety of fees and profit-sharing rules. We build a model to estimate the expected 
revenue to managers as a function of these rules, and we test how this estimated revenue 
varies across the characteristics of our sample funds.  We find major differences between 
venture capital (VC) funds and buyout (BO) funds – the two main sectors of the private 
equity industry.   In general, BO fund managers earn lower revenue per managed dollar 
than do managers of VC funds, but nevertheless these BO managers have substantially 
higher present values for revenue per partner and revenue per professional than do VC 
managers.  Furthermore, BO managers build on their prior experience by raising larger 
funds, which leads to significantly higher revenue per partner and per professional, 
despite the fact that these larger funds have lower revenue per dollar.  Conversely, while 
prior experience by VC managers does lead to higher revenue per partner in later funds, it 
does not lead to higher revenue per professional. Taken together, these results suggest 
that the BO business is more scalable than the VC business.   
What emerges from our analysis is a picture of a labor-intensive, high value-added, 
and high-rent industry that nonetheless has significant heterogeneity.  Recall from Table I 
that the median BO fund in our sample makes 2.4 investments per partner.  Moreover,   36
this range of 2-3 firms per partner appears to be fairly stable across the inter-quartile 
range.  The numbers are consistent with Heel and Kehoe (2005) which report that 
successful BO deal partners devote around 50 percent of his/her time on the company 
during the first several months after the transaction, and spend around 5-15 percent of 
his/her time per company after the first several months.  The rest of her time may be split 
between screening for new investments, arranging for exits, and fundraising for new 
funds.    
The key feature of the BO business is that once a BO manager is successful in 
handling $100M-size companies this way, the same skill can be applied to manage $1B 
companies without a complete elimination of excess performance. (At least, the market 
believes this to be the case, or else investors would not allow these terms for BO funds.) 
This scalability allows BO funds to sharply increase the size of the fund (and more 
crucially the size of the capital managed per partner or professional) while keeping the 
number of companies per partner and per professional fairly constant.  
This is in sharp contrast to the VC business.  VC funds invest by definition in a small 
firm, with valuation of no more than $25-50M in case of early-stage VC.   Their goal is to 
hold these firms until they are mature enough to have an exit value of $150-$200M or 
more.  The median VC fund in our sample makes 5 investments per partner (see Table I).  
Again, this ratio appears to be very stable across the range. In other words, even the most 
successful VC partner is not capable of supervising 50 ventures successfully. The value-
added of a venture capitalist includes screening firms based on technology, business 
model, and management team, helping the founder team to hire key personnel, introduce 
them to potential customers, suppliers, etc., as well as advising them generally on growth   37
and exit strategy as board member.  Unfortunately, these skills are critical in helping 
firms that are in their developmental infancy and poised for high growth, but not 
applicable to more mature firms that are 10 times larger and already in possession of core 
management skills.  In other words, the ideal firm size for VC business is bounded above.  
So when successful VC firms increase the size of their fund, which they do to some 
extent, they cannot just scale up the size of each firm they invest in without dissipating 
their source of rent.  The best they can do is to back more companies of the same size as 
before.  Doing this, however, requires hiring more partners and non-partners, so even as 
the aggregate fund size grows, capital managed per investment professional cannot grow 
as fast.  
Both types of private equity are inherently labor-intensive, skill-based business.   The 
crucial difference between BO and VC derives from the fact that a BO manager's skill 
can add value to extremely large companies, whereas a VC manager's skill can only add 
value to generally small companies.  Our analysis shows that this difference has 
significant implications for organizational economics of the two segments of private 




Agarwal, Vikas, Daniel, Naveen and Narayan Naik, 2006, Role of Managerial Incentives 
and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance, Unpublished working paper, London 
Business School.  
 
Asset Alternatives, 2005, Galante’s Venture Capital & Private Equity Directory. 
 
Axelson, Ulf, Per Stromberg, and Michael Weisbach, 2007, Why are Buyouts Levered: 
The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds, NBER Working Paper.  
   38
Berk, Jonathan and Richard Green, 2004, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in 
Rational Markets, Journal of Political Economy 112, 1269-95. 
 
Campbell, John Y., Martin Lettau, Burton Malkiel, and Yexiao Xu, 2001, Have 
Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Investigation of 
Idiosyncratic Risk, Journal of Finance 56(1). 
 
Cao, Jerry, and Josh Lerner, 2007, The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts, 
Unpublished working Paper, Harvard Business School.  
 
Chordia, Tarun, 1996, The Structure of Mutual Fund Charges, Journal of Financial 
Economics  41, 3-39. 
 
Christoffersen, Susan, 2001, Why Do Money Fund Managers Voluntarily Waive Their 
Fees?, Journal of Finance 56, 1117-40. 
 
Christoffersen, Susan and David Musto, 2002, Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money 
Management, Review of Financial Studies 15, 1499-1524. 
 
Cochrane, John, 2005, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, Journal of Financial 
Economics 75, 3-52. 
 
Conner, Andrew, 2005, The economics value of terms and conditions:  What is worth 
fighting for?, Journal of of Private Equity, Summer 2005.   
 
Ferris, Stephen and Don Chance, The Effect of 12b-1 Plans on Mutual Fund Expense 
Ratios: A Note, Journal of Finance 42, 1077-82. 
 
Goetzmann, William, Ingersoll, Jonathan, Jr. and Stephen Ross, 2003, High-Water Marks 
and Hedge Fund Management Contracts, Journal of Finance 58, 1685-1717. 
 
Gompers, Paul and Josh Lerner, 1999, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture 
Capital Partnership, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 3-44.   
 
Groh, Alexander, and Oliver Gottschalg, 2007, The Risk-Adjusted Performance of US 
Buyouts, Unpublished working paper, HEC School of Management.  
 
Heel, Joachim, and Conor Kehoe, 2005, Why Some Private Equity Firms Do Better Than 
Others, The McKinsey Quarterly, n1, pp. 24-26.  
 
Hellmann, Thomas, and Manju Puri, 2000, The Interaction between Product Market and 
Financing Strategy:  The Role of Venture Capital, Review of Financial Studies 13, 
pp. 959-984.  
 
Hellmann, Thomas, and Manju Puri, 2002, Venture Capital and the Professionalization of 
Start-Up Firms:  Empirical Evidcne, Journal of Finance 57, pp. 169-197.    39
 
Hochberg, Yael, Alexander Ljungqvist, and Yang Lu, Whom You Know Matters: 
Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance, 2007, Journal of Finance 
62, pp. 251-302.  
 
Hsu, David, 2004, What do Entrepreneurs Pay for venture capital Affiliation?, Journal of 
Finance 59. 
 
Kaplan, Steven, 1999, Accel VII, Mimeo. 
 
Kaplan, Steven and Antoinette Schoar, 2005, Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence, and Capital Flows, Journal of Finance 60, 1791-1823. 
 
Kaplan, Steven and Jeremy Stein, 1993, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial 
Structure in the 1980s, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, pp. 313-357.  
 
Litvak, Kate, 2004, Venture capital limited partnership agreements:  Understanding 
compensation arrangements, Unpublished working paper, University of Texas at 
Austin.  
 
Metrick, Andrew, 2007, Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation, John Wiley & 
Sons.  
 
Phalippou, Ludovic and Oliver Gottschalg, 2006, Performance of Private Equity Funds, 
Unpublished working paper, University of Amsterdam.  
 
Private Equity Intelligence, 2006, The 2006 Private Equity Performance Monitor. 
 
Sorensen, Morten, 2007, How Smart is Smart Money? An Empirical Two-Sided Model 
of Venture Capital, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Tufano, Peter and Matthew Sevick, 1997, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. 
Mutual Fund Industry, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 321-55. 
 
Venture Economics, 2006a, Investment Benchmarks Report: Venture Capital. 
 
Venture Economics, 2006b, Investment Benchmarks Report: Buyouts and other Private 
Equity. 
 
Woodward, Susan E, 2004, Measuring Risk and Performance for Private Equity, mimeo, 
Sand Hill Econometrics. 
 
 Table I 
Sample Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents sample summary statistics for the 238 VC and BO funds in our sample.  Panel A gives 
the data on the 94 VC funds and Panel B gives the data on the 144 BO funds.  “Size” is the amount of 
committed capital  in $  millions.  “First fund dummy”  is  1 if  the fund  is  the first fund for which  the 
management firm is raising public money (not captive money), and 0 otherwise.  “# of past funds” is the 
number of funds that the management firm has raised prior to the current fund.  “Firm age” is the difference 
between the vintage year of the firm’s first fund and the vintage year of the current fund.  “# of partners” is 
the number of partners in the management firm.  “# of professionals” is the sum of the number of partners 
and the number of non-partner investment professionals in the management firm.   “# of investments” is 
fund size divided by the expected size of investments. 
 
 
         
Panel A:  Venture capital fund characteristics  (94 funds) 
  mean  25%  median  75% 
Size  $322  $100  $225  $394 
First fund dummy  0.44       
# of past funds  1.78  0  1  3 
Firm age (years)  4.69  0  3  8 
# of partners  4.81  3  4  6 
# of professionals  11.49  7  9  13 
# of investments  24.24  15  20  30 
         
Panel B:  Buyout firm characteristics (144 funds) 
  mean  25%  median  75% 
Size  $1,238  $297  $600  $1,500 
First fund dummy  0.27       
# of past funds  1.80  0  1  3 
Firm age (years)  6.44  0  6  11 
# of partners  6.10  3  5  7 
# of professionals  20.33  9  13  24 
# of investments  14.76  9.75  12  16.67 
         
 Table II 
Fund Terms 
 
This table presents summary statistics on fund terms for the VC and buyout funds raised in the 
1992-2006 period.  “Initial fee level” is the level of annual management fees as the percentage of 
the fund’s committed capital at the beginning of the fund’s life.  “% of funds changing fee basis 
after investment period” is the proportion of funds that changes its fee basis from committed 
capital to (net) invested capital after the completion of the investment period (which is typically 5 
years  for  a  10-year  fund).    “%  of  funds  changing  fee  level  after  investment  period”  is  the 
proportion of funds that changes its fee level from its initial fee level after the completion of the 
investment period.  “% of funds changing both basis and level” is the proportion of funds that 
changes both its fee basis and fee level after the investment period.  “Carry level” is the level of 
carried interest as the percentage of the fund’s net profit.  “% of funds requiring return of fees 
before carry” is the proportion of funds that uses committed capital as its carry basis (as opposed 
to investment capital).  “% of funds with hurdle return” is the proportion of funds that entitles LPs 
to a pre-specified level of hurdle return before carried interest is paid to GPs.  “Hurdle level” is 
the level of annual hurdle return for those funds which have hurdle returns. 
Panel A:  VC Panel B:  Buyout
# of funds with initial fee level 
     greater than 2% 39 11
     equal to 2% 42 59
     less than 2% 9 74
% of funds changing fee basis after investment period 43.0% 84.0%
% of funds changing fee level after investment period 54.8% 45.1%
% of funds changing both basis and level  16.1% 38.9%
# of funds with carry level 
    greater than 20% 4 0
    equal to 20% 87 142
    less than 20% 1 0
% of funds requiring return of fees before carry 92.1% 83.2%
% of funds with hurdle return 47.6% 93.1%
# of funds with hurdle level 
    greater than 8% 5 18
    equal to 8% 28 105





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Management-Fee Model: Outputs 
 
This table smmarizes outputs of the management-fee model for the base case (neither fee basis nor fee level 
change) and three alternative cases (fee basis change, fee level change in the post-investment-period, and both 
basis and level change).  Panel A presents the lifetime fees expressed as a percentage of committed capital; 
Panel B presents the PV of fees expressed as a percentage of committed capital.  Lifetime fees are the sum of 
management fees paid to GP over the lifetime of the fund.   A Riskfree rate of 5% is used to discount the fees.  








duration 10 15.0% 20.0% 25.0%
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
duration 10 9.7% 12.8% 15.9%
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
New  1.00% 12.5% 15.0% 17.5%
fee   1.50% NA 17.5% 20.0%
level 2.00% NA NA 22.5%
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
New  1.00% 9.0% 11.4% 13.9%
fee   1.50% NA 12.1% 14.6%
level 2.00% NA NA 15.2%
Panel A: Lifetime fees
No fee basis / level change 
Initial fee level
Fee basis changes to invested
Initial fee level
Fee level goes down
Initial fee level
Both basis and level change
Initial fee level 
 
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
duration 10 12.1% 16.1% 20.2%
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
duration 10 8.4% 11.1% 13.8%
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
New  1.00% 10.3% 12.6% 14.9%
fee   1.50% NA 14.4% 16.6%
level 2.00% NA NA 18.4%
1.50% 2.00% 2.50%
New  1.00% 7.9% 10.1% 12.3%
fee   1.50% NA 10.6% 12.8%
level 2.00% NA NA 13.3%
Panel B: PV of  fees
No fee basis / level change 
Initial fee level
Fee basis changes to invested
Initial fee level
Fee level goes down
Initial fee level
Both basis and level change
Initial fee level 
Table V 
Carried Interest Model: Outputs 
 
This table presents the simulation results for the PV of carried interest.  Panel A summarizes 
results for VC funds with either 25 or 15 investments, and Panel B summarizes the results for 
BO funds with either 11 or 5 investments.  “Investment capital basis” is set to 85 percent of 
the committed capital basis.  “8% hurdle rate” includes a 100 percent catch-up.   
 
 
Panel A: Venture Capital Funds 
 
 
Panel A-1: VC: 25 Investments 
Committed Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $8.63  $11.26 
8% Hurdle   $8.29  $10.77 
 
Panel A-2: VC: 15 Investments 
Committed Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $9.02  $11.78 




Panel A-3: VC: 25 Investments 
Investment Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $9.69  $12.70 
8% Hurdle   $9.39  $12.26 
 
 
Panel A-4: VC: 15 Investments 
Investment Capital Basis  
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $10.07  $13.21 
8% Hurdle   $9.77  $12.78  
 
Panel B: Buyout Funds 
 
Panel B-1: BO: 11 Investments 
Committed Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $5.88  $7.67 
8% Hurdle   $5.17  $6.68 
 
 
Panel B-2: BO: 5 Investments 
Committed Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $7.20  $9.44 




Panel B-3: BO: 11 Investments 
Investment Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $7.37  $9.68 
8% Hurdle   $6.72  $8.76 
 
 
Panel B-4: BO: 5 Investments 
Investment Capital Basis 
 
Carry Level 
 20%  25% 
No Hurdle  $8.73  $11.51 
8% Hurdle   $8.14  $10.68 
 
 Table VI 
Summary Statistics: Revenue Estimates 
 
This table presents sample summary statistics for revenue estimates.  Panel A gives the data on the 94 VC 
funds and Panel B gives the data on the 144 BO funds.  Carry per $100 is the present value of carried 
interest per hundred dollars under management.  Carry per partner is the present value of carried interest 
per partner in $millions. Carry per professional (partners plus non-partners) is the present value of carried 
interest per professional in $millions. Other measures are defined similarly. Variable revenue is the sum of 
carried interest, monitoring fees, and exit transaction fees.  Fixed revenue is the sum of management fees 
and entry transaction fees.  Each measure was constructed using the model described in Section III and 
reflecting the relevant terms for each fund.   
 
 
        
Panel A:  Venture capital fund characteristics  (94 funds) 
Present Value of  mean  25%  median  75% 
Carry per $100  $8.98  $8.40  $8.86  $9.32 
Management fees per $100  $14.80  $12.04  $14.61  $17.61 
Total revenue per $100  $23.78  $20.92  $23.50  $26.69 
Carry per partner   $7.04  $2.14  $4.45  $7.68 
Management fees per partner   $10.57  $3.69  $7.13  $12.67 
Total revenue per partner   $17.61  $5.74  $11.21  $19.99 
Carry per professional  $2.69  $1.09  $1.95  $3.43 
Management fees per professional  $4.19  $1.73  $3.43  $5.20 
Total revenue per professional  $6.87  $2.76  $5.68  $8.56 
        
Panel B:  Buyout firm characteristics (144 funds) 
Present Value of  mean  25%  median  75% 
Carry per $100  $5.41  $4.98  $5.35  $5.93 
Variable revenue per $100  $7.54  $6.29  $7.46  $8.46 
Management fees per $100  $10.35  $8.77  $10.34  $11.65 
Fixed revenue per $100  $12.22  $10.11  $11.78  $14.02 
Total revenue per $100  $19.76  $16.49  $19.36  $22.56 
Carry per partner  $10.27  $3.38  $6.27  $12.73 
Variable revenue per partner  $14.21  $4.25  $8.94  $17.94 
Management fees per partner  $18.47  $6.85  $12.93  $24.33 
Fixed revenue per partner  $21.70  $7.15  $14.63  $27.35 
Total revenue per partner  $35.93  $11.38  $24.07  $46.57 
Carry per professional  $3.54  $1.27  $2.32  $3.80 
Variable revenue per professional  $4.92  $1.94  $3.31  $5.69 
Management fees per professional  $6.52  $2.74  $4.67  $7.41 
Fixed revenue per professional  $7.66  $3.39  $5.25  $8.77 
Total revenue per professional  $12.58  $5.21  $8.56  $14.72 
        
        
 Table VII 
Regression Results 
 
Panels A, B, and C of this table summarize the results of multivariate regressions 
of various revenue measures on proxies of managers’ past success. (Equation (6) in the 
text.)  The revenue measures are the present values of carried interest, total variable 
revenue (carry + exit transaction fees + monitoring fees), management fees, total fixed 
revenue (management fees + entry transaction fees), and total revenue (carry + (entry &  
exit) transaction fees + monitoring fees + management fees), with each of these measures 
normalized in turn by the number of partners (Panel A), number of professionals (Panel 
B), and committed capital (Panel C).  Log(sequence) is the natural logarithm of the 
number or previous funds (including the current fund) by the same firm.  Log (# of top 
quartile funds) is the natural logarithm of the number of top-quartile performing funds 
out of the most recent four funds raised by the same firm plus one.  To benchmark these 
funds, we combine our data from the Investor with industry benchmarks drawn from 
Private Equity Intelligence (2006) and Venture Economics (2006a and 2006b). Panel D 
summarizes results of estimating Eq. (6) using measures of fund size as the dependent 
variable.  These measures are the log of committed capital, and the log of committed 
capital normalized by the number of partners and by the number of professionals. All 
regressions also include constant terms and year fixed effects separately for VC and BO 
funds.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten percent, five percent, and 











log(sequence)     
      *VC dummy (βVC) 4.8470 4.8470 7.0303 7.0303 11.8774
 (1.7160)*** (2.1427)** (2.5987)*** (2.9509)** (5.0654)**
      *BP dummy (βBO) 5.2610 6.3611 9.0387 9.2687 15.6298
 (1.7819)*** (2.2251)*** (2.6986)*** (3.0643)*** (5.2601)***
log(# of top-quartile funds)
      *VC dummy  -2.6248 -2.6248 -4.4013 -4.4013 -7.0260
(-3.5108) (4.3840) (-5.3169) -6.0374 -10.3638
      *BP dummy  -0.5478 -0.7072 0.5211 0.5308 -0.1764
(-2.6053) (3.2532) (3.9456) (4.4802) -7.6907
    
Year F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant term  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values for H0: βBO-βVC=0 0.87 0.63 0.74 0.60 0.65
R
2 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.54
N of observations 234 234 234 234 234












log(sequence)     
      *VC dummy (βVC) 0.5443 0.5443 0.8991 0.8991 1.4434
 (0.5231) (0.6932) (0.9540) (1.0793) (1.7616)
      *BP dummy (βBO) 2.5792 3.3238 4.7567 5.1531 8.4769
 (0.5251)*** (0.6959)*** (0.9577)*** (1.0835)*** (1.7685)***
log(# of top-quartile funds)
      *VC dummy  -0.2491 -0.2491 -1.1591 -1.1591 -1.4082
-1.0330 (1.3689) (-1.8839) -2.1314 -3.4788
      *BP dummy  -0.3428 -0.5114 -0.0387 -0.1290 -0.6404
-0.7986 -1.0582 (-1.4564) -1.6477 -2.6893
    
Year F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant term  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values for H0: βBO-βVC=0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R
2 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.60
N of observations 221 221 221 221 221
Panel B: Per-Professional Revenue Measure
 
 
Dependent variable  carry per $
variable 





log(sequence)     
      *VC dummy (βVC) -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0051 0.0051 0.0049
 (-0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0055)
      *BP dummy (βBO) -0.0034 -0.0063 -0.0104 -0.0144 -0.0206
 (-0.0013)*** (0.0019)*** (-0.0041)** (0.0046)*** (0.0058)***
log(# of top-quartile funds)
      *VC dummy  0.0031 0.0031 -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0058
(0.0025) (0.0038) (-0.0080) (0.0091) (0.0114)
      *BP dummy  -0.0005 0.0006 0.0067 0.0085 0.0091
(-0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0085)
    
Year F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant term  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values for H0: βBO-βVC=0 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.003 0.002
R
2 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.98
N of observations 236 236 236 236 236











      *VC dummy (βVC) 0.3885 0.2191 0.1503
 (0.1364)*** (0.1352) (0.1306)
      *BP dummy (βBO) 1.0134 0.5693 0.6182
 (0.1444)*** (0.1404)*** (0.1311)***
log(# of top-quartile funds)
      *VC dummy  0.1811 0.0689 0.0656
(0.2844) (0.2767) (0.2578)
      *BP dummy  0.0271 0.0150 -0.0434
(0.2111) (0.2053) (-0.1993)
 
Year F.E.  Yes Yes Yes
constant term  Yes Yes Yes
p-values for H0: βBO-βVC=0 0.002 0.07 0.01
R
2 0.98 0.97 0.96
N of observations 236 234 221
Panel D:   Fund Size
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o
m
p
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e
 
L
P
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a
l
u
e
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t
e
p
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&
 
L
P
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o
s
t
 
(
S
t
e
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I
F
 
L
P
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
>
 
L
P
 
C
o
s
t
 
t
h
e
n
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
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o
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n
d
 
r
e
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S
T
E
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L
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l
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h
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n
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r
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L
P
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
=
 
L
P
 
C
o
s
t
 
t
h
e
n
 
V
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V
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a
n
d
 
t
h
i
s
 
c
a
s
e
 
i
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c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
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s
e
t
 
c
a
r
r
y
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a
v
e
r
a
g
e
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a
r
r
i
e
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i
n
t
e
r
e
s
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a
c
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o
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0
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0
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r
i
a
l
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i
m
u
l
a
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o
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g
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o
w
c
h
a
r
t
 
f
o
r
 
E
a
c
h
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r
i
a
l
S
T
E
P
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:
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r
a
w
 
e
x
i
t
 
t
i
m
e
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o
r
 
e
a
c
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i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
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n
u
a
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r
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a
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a
c
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i
n
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e
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t
m
e
n
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i
m
u
l
a
t
e
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r
e
t
u
r
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p
a
t
h
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
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o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
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n
d
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
i
n
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
I
I
I
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B
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o
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t
h
e
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c
e
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e
x
i
t
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
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o
 
t
h
e
f
u
n
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r
u
l
e
s
 
g
i
v
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n
 
i
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S
T
E
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E
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:
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
L
P
 
v
a
l
u
e
,
c
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
e
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s
,
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
 
f
e
e
s
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